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Abstract—We propose a decentralized conceptual marketplace
model for IoT generated personal data. Our model is based on a
thorough analysis of personal data in a marketplace context, with
specific focus on the challenges presented by commercializing
IoT generated personal data. Our model introduces a novel
perspective on the commercialization of personal data for a
marketplace context via risk evaluation and a data licensing
framework. We have designed our model to be centered around
protecting the privacy and data rights of data generators through
model components that effectively assess and modify transaction
risks, and formalize transaction agreements by establishing rights
of data use and access between buyer and seller. Our model could
serve as a blueprint to inform the implementation of a personal
data marketplace that respects privacy and ownership.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONNECTED devices have seen an exponential rise inpopularity in recent years and this trend is not expected
to wane. It is, therefore, crucial that we consider how the field
of privacy research will be affected by this technological trend.
Individuals are likely to generate personal data through the
use of connected devices at an unprecedented rate, which has
repercussions for privacy and data ownership as we know it.
Ideally, any new technology should empower users and grant
them new avenues to exercise their digital rights, including
furthering their involvement in the way their personal data
is used. As users generate more personal data than ever
before through their devices, we must seriously consider what
ramifications this will have for the way personal data is used.
Based on the assumption that the sale of personal data by
users is an inevitable next step in the growth of the Internet
of Things (IoT), and an efficient way to spread the wealth
created from digital technologies, this paper focuses on the
specific question: What is the best model to use when dealing
with the sale of personal data while keeping privacy intact?
In 2011, a World Economic Forum (WEF) initiative resulted
in a report on personal data and its uses shedding light on
a vision of oncoming shifts regarding the commercialization
of personal data in the near future. The report claims that
personal data, what it refers to as “digital data created by
and about people [1]”, is gaining importance and salience as
it generates “a new wave of opportunity for economic and
societal value creation [1]”. Indeed, this new dawn for personal
data stems from its value as a new-asset class in a post-
industrial context [1]. The main idea propelling this vision
is the concept that industries will find personal data to be the
fuel they need to innovate their products and services. Beyond
its potential uses for industry, personal data also stands to
become a valuable asset for data generators themselves, who
can potentially reap benefits from a new ecosystem that is
flourishing around the uses of personal data. Personal data has
been referred to by Maglena Kuneva, the European Consumer
Commissioner, as “the new oil of the Internet and the new
currency of the digital world [1]”. At the same time, the WEF
report highlights how fragmented the state of the personal data
ecosystem is. It is clear that there are concerns for privacy, as
well as others, that are glaringly obvious. As the rally behind
the WEF’s vision grows and personal data continues to be
hailed as a transformative resource in modern economies, it
will become critical to address these concerns in full [1].
The report states that current institutions and frameworks
“fall short of providing the legal and technical infrastructure
needed to support a well-functioning digital economy [1]”.
There are risks associated with the use of personal data for
those who generate it and their privacy. IoT privacy risks
represent a specific kind of privacy threat given the personal
and intimate nature of the data that IoT devices can generate.
There is also the additional risks stemming from the types of
insights and discoveries that can be achieved by processing
IoT generated personal data through data mining procedures
and other metadata generating techniques. The kind of insight
that can result from such undertakings, using IoT generated
personal data, can reveal intimate and personal dimensions
of the data generator’s private life, thereby exposing them to
serious hazards.
Our approach to providing a transaction model for IoT
generated personal data is divided into two parts: our analysis
of the subject followed by our proposed marketplace model.
Our methodology is to move from the abstract concept of
personal data, to personal data as a marketplace product, and
then to propose a marketplace model in which such a product
could be effectively bought and sold without compromising the
privacy of the data subject. This shift from abstract to practical
requires that we look at the concept of personal data in the
abstract to find the qualities that will become challenging in the
pursuit of bringing personal data into a marketplace context.
We will perform an analysis of these challenges and design
model components to address them. Then, we will provide a
description of the full marketplace model, its components, and
its interactions. Our proposed response is a model that provides
the functionality required by our original question: allowing
individuals to buy and sell personal data, protecting personal
data rights, and protecting the privacy of data generators.
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2The starting point for this analysis is a discussion of the
context in which personal data can be transacted: namely the
personal data marketplace. Our analysis involves a discussion
of the challenges faced by marketplaces in general, as well
as a focus on the specific challenges that a personal data
marketplace would present. This kind of exploration calls
for a definition of personal data in a marketplace context.
This definition includes a description of how ownership is
established and understood for personal data. This description
must highlight the connection between data and the user that
generates it, as well as how this constitutes ownership, or “the
right to” use, dispose, or sell such data. Our definition of
personal data in a marketplace context must also describe the
basis on which we can say personal data holds any marketplace
value at all: it should take into account the elements that make
personal data a desirable asset in a marketplace context. As
we develop this analysis of personal data in a marketplace
context, we will also develop specific model components that
address any challenges we encounter to the commercialization
of personal data.
The second part of our approach is the model proposal that
connects the model components stemming from our analysis,
and also provides the functionality outlined in our original
research question. This proposed model must include a clear
description of how the marketplace operates, who are its
actors, and how data transactions occur between the seller
and buyer. The description of the transaction process must
incorporate marketplace mechanisms that will safeguard the
marketplace from the challenges generated by the commercial-
ization of personal data, as well as the different marketplace
interactions that enable successful transactions between buyers
and sellers. Essentially, our proposed marketplace model will
describe a set of components, mechanisms, and interactions,
that provide the expected functionality of a personal data
marketplace and allow the marketplace to succeed in its goal
of protecting the privacy and rights of the data subject.
The model we describe in this paper is a conceptual one.
It is not meant to be a recommendation of a specific system,
or technical implementation for a personal data marketplace.
It will include technical recommendations, but it is primarily
meant as a blueprint to inform the implementation of a
personal data marketplace that respects a set of values: privacy
and ownership. After all, technology will change, advance,
and innovate in ways we cannot foresee, but the need to
protect personal data rights and the privacy of data generators
is something that we consider to be a constant, unchanging,
factor in the discussion of the commercialization of personal
data.
II. PERSONAL DATA CHALLENGES & RELATED MODEL
COMPONENTS
A. The Marketplace Context
This paper aims to describe an appropriate model through
which the parties involved in the transacting of personal data
can benefit. As a starting point for this model, we propose a
data marketplace as the core of a framework which facilitates
the buying and selling of personal data while addressing the
risks involved. The reason for choosing a marketplace as a
base involves some insight from marketplace theory: a broad
discussion on how marketplaces enable transactions between
parties follows ahead to further clarify this decision.
The transaction between a data generator and a data buyer,
much like any transaction between buyer and seller, must begin
somewhere. Regardless of which side you are facing from, the
buyer or the seller, the transaction begins with a search and
its associated costs. The search cost is the price that either a
buyer or a seller must pay in order to find someone to willing
to enter into a transaction with them. Therefore, the price tag of
a given item involves more than just the valuation of the item
itself, it involves the search costs associated with locating the
necessary party that would allow the transaction to take place
[2]. Search costs may be particularly onerous when it comes
to the buying and selling of personal data given its extremely
flexible nature. The categorical limitations on personal data
are vague at best, personal data can be generated in many
ways and therefore take many forms. From riding a bike to
work every day to the percentages of enzymes in the body at
a given moment, any of these could form a data set that a data
generator might be interested in selling.
The potential specificity of such data sets means that finding
a party interested in transacting could be costly, in terms of
time or other resources. As noted by the WEC, the things
that personal data can be used for are also largely varied.
As an example, a shoe company may be interested in data
from suburban middle aged women that actively jog in order
to optimize the design of a new sneaker line and hit sale
targets within a specific demographic. To depict the level
of specificity, take for example an ice cream company that
may be interested in data sets comprised of the dietary logs
of people from a specific age range in order to determine
the average ice cream consumption of a given populations
and change their pint size accordingly. Finding individuals
that have these specific data sets for sale would be costly.
A marketplace provides a solution to this challenge, it is an
environment in which buyers and sellers can easily connect
regardless of specificity, therefore driving down search costs
considerably. The strength of the marketplace is its matching
ability, it “accommodates those who own and those who seek
[2]”.
By driving down search costs, a data marketplace would
help facilitate transactions between those who want to sell
their data, and those looking to buy. Unfortunately, searching is
not the only obstacle to buying and selling data. Marketplaces
are defined categorically by the type of assets that are traded
in them. As defined by Dushnitsky and Klueter, knowledge
marketplaces are those where knowledge owners and knowl-
edge seekers meet. The authors describe knowledge owners
as “those who arrive at a market with knowledge assets [2]”,
and knowledge seekers as “those who arrive at a market with
the intention to transact with knowledge owners [2]”. These
definitions are not at all different from our own descriptions
of the data generator and the data buyer. The value of personal
data is not inherently found in its physical form, but instead
it is found in the insight that personal data can provide:
knowledge that can be utilized to optimize, enhance, advance
3and innovate. Conceptually, there is no distinction between
data, and what Dushnitsky and Klueter refer to as “knowledge
assets [2]”. Knowledge assets are particularly inclined to cause
two serious problems for buyers and sellers: the adverse
selection problem and the expropriation problem. The adverse
selection and expropriation problems refer to the specific risks
data sellers or data buyers face in the marketplace. These two
problems are so severe that they alone can be responsible for
bringing about a marketplace breakdown.
The adverse selection problem refers to an information
asymmetry between buyer and seller. Evaluating the quality of
a knowledge asset is difficult. Malicious actors can take ad-
vantage of this asymmetry to pose as reputable data sellers and
effectively deceive buyers into purchasing junk data [2]. An
element of trust is required to engage in such a transaction, and
unfortunately when profit is on the line, those who seek to take
advantage of the adverse selection problem will likely never
be in short supply. It is not hard to imagine how one would go
about taking advantage of the adverse selection problem: all a
malicious actor needs to do is buy a dataset of the data they
plan on imitating, mimicking the specific data characteristics
and distributions, and then falsely generating the data using
unspecified means and back-logging it to disguise it with
historical validity. This requires a marketplace mechanism
that can somehow alleviate the information asymmetry, either
via data validation or other means, and diffuse the adverse
selection problem, or at least dilute it to such a level that the
risk is so minimal it is easily tolerable by transacting parties.
On the other hand, the expropriation problem is one that
puts the seller at risk. This problem involves ownership: as
Dushnitksy & Klueter note, knowledge replication has very
little cost associated with it, and sharing knowledge assets
does not deplete them [2]. This goes double for personal data,
replicating and sharing it is only a click away, at virtually no
cost. Once a seller dispenses with their data to a buying party,
that entity can then resell the data for pure profit, a chain that
could go on endlessly with second-hand, third-hand up to nth-
hand sellers. This asymmetry must also be mitigated in order
to increase the stability of the marketplace. Part of the value of
personal data comes from its exclusivity, the other part comes
from its uniqueness, therefore the resell problem theoretically
devalues the data each time it is sold second hand.
Data generators who have the intent of selling personal
data face the expropriation problem and the adverse selection
problem in tandem. To prove the legitimacy of their data, they
must reveal some of it prior to sale or risk the cost of widening
the information asymmetry. But if they reveal their data prior
to sale they risk it being imitated, devaluing it or outright
losing it. This calls for data handling protocols between buyer
and seller that can overcome these two challenges in clever
ways. Although classical knowledge assets include things like
inventions and other intellectual properties, which are well reg-
ulated by now and entrenched in most modern legal systems,
personal data is a nascent type of knowledge asset that does
not enjoy the same type of institutional support and protection.
For this reason, data marketplaces are especially vulnerable to
the adverse selection, and expropriation problems.
B. Data Ownership in a Marketplace Context
In order to provide a model that describes the transacting
of personal data, we must first clarify what we are referring
to when we talk about personal data. From the name itself we
gather that it is something that has two kinds of qualities: the
personal qualities and the quantifiable qualities. Each of these
two categories contributes towards the meaning of personal
data, but the concept truly is more than the sum of its two
parts, part personal and part data. The combination of the two
allows for specific qualities that must be considered as well.
The most simple and straightforward definition we can give
of personal data stems from the acts and circumstances which
instantiate it. Namely, we refer to the event in which a person
decides to use a form of technology to transform some aspect
of their personal experience into a quantifiable form that can be
physically stored. In fact, this isn’t too far off from the official
definition of personal data used by the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which defines
personal data as “any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (’data subject’) [3]”. What the
GDPR definition is missing when compared to what we give
above is the aspect of instantiation. The GDPR definition is a
more general definition meant to address the numerous types
of personal data that can exist, and how they vary depending
on the way they are instantiated. A taxonomy of personal data
has been proposed based on the varying degrees of proprietary
entitlement that a person has to said data based on how it
becomes instantiated [4].
In its initial form, the taxonomy was suggested with three
different types of personal data: types where there is a strong
proprietary relationship between a person and their data, types
with an intermediate proprietary relationship, and types with
a weak relationship [4]. Data types with a strong relationship
refer to those where a data subject directly and willingly
provides information to a second party, an example of this
is when a person fills in a form online, or willingly provides
personal information on a public digital space. The relationship
here is very clear, and it is easy to track the proprietary source
of the data. It’s obvious that without a person to provide it,
this type of data is completely inaccessible [4]. Data types
with an intermediate relationship refer to those were the data
is provided indirectly, but via “real” means of instantiation. An
example of this is the data that is generated as a byproduct of
using GPS or via the use of a web browser. The relationship
here is still clear, although not as strong as the first type since
the data subject is not required to provide the data directly, it
can be a byproduct of their digital activity, yet it is still directly
linked to the data subject [4]. Lastly, data types with a weak
relationship are those where new data is created by applying
some process to personal data. For example, forecasting or
predictive information generated by analysis of personal data,
which have a very weak proprietary link to the data subject
themselves [4]. The taxonomy essentially defines types of data
based on how many deviations a data type takes away from
the data subject, with personal metadata at the end of the chain
being essentially data about personal data.
With this taxonomy in mind, we can see that personal
4data generated by the data subject prior to transacting has an
equally strong proprietary relationship, if not stronger, than
data willingly submitted on a digital platform. It is personal
data that is still completely in control and under the ownership
of the data subject. Here we make a distinction between
personal data in general, and personal data as defined in the
context of a data marketplace. Unless explicitly stated, from
here on in when we refer to personal data we are talking
about data generated and stored by the data subject with the
intention of capitalizing on its value via a data marketplace
transaction. What is critical is that at its inception personal data
is completely within the proprietary jurisdiction of the data
subject and generator. Without clarifying this aspect of our
definition of personal data, a data marketplace model cannot
exist, given it violates one of the fundamental tenets of the
marketplace: how do you sell something you don’t own? It is
crucial to crystalize two aspects of personal data to place it
in the context of a marketplace : the proprietary element of
personal data is one of them, which we have done here via the
introduction of the proprietary chain of data. The other aspect
that needs clarification in order to contextualize personal data
in the marketplace is the value of personal data. These are the
two necessary elements in a transaction: ownership must be
established before it can be transferred, and a value must be
established before its price can be paid. Having established
ownership here, we must now establish how personal data is
valued, and thus how a price is established.
C. The Value Problem: Rivalry & Excludability
As part of their excellent analysis of the challenges and
obstacles that personal data markets face, Spiekermann et al
crystalize the issue of finding a monetary value for personal
data. They argue that personal data has the earmarks of a
free commons since it is “non-rival, cheap to produce, cheap
to copy, and cheap to transmit [5]”. The authors claim that
for personal data to resemble a marketplace commodity, it
would have to somehow gain the qualities of rivalry and
excludability. For personal data to have rival and excludable
qualities in the marketplace would require that personal data
be placed in a context where having its consumption by
one party would mean that no other party would be able
to simultaneously consume it, and that only a paying party
would be able to benefit from the transaction. Recalling the
introductory discussion provided here on knowledge assets,
we come back to the inescapable fact that the nature itself of
personal data is the primary source of challenges to the data
marketplace. Personal data can also be conceptualized as a
form of intellectual capital, described by Jean-Jacques Lambin
as “all non-material resources that could be considered as
capitalizable assets of an economic agent [6]”. This means that
in order to fully conceptualize a functional data marketplace,
it may be necessary to let go of the idea of personal data as
a commodity, a raw material that can be sold and traded, and
consider its value as an intangible asset.
Lambin is very clear about the pitfalls of intellectual capital,
given that they are derived “directly from the employment
of the relational, effective and cerebral faculties of human
beings [6]”. Lambin identifies knowledge as one of the primary
members in the category of intellectual capital, and referencing
Kenneth Arrow’s framework for knowledge as an economic
good, also identifies the non-rival and non-exclusive qualities
of knowledge as the key components of the “knowledge
dilemma [6]”. The dilemma highlights the conflictual dynamic
between the non-rival and non-exclusive qualities of knowl-
edge, and the great commercial potential of knowledge. For
the purpose of this cognitive model when we talk about rivalry
we refer to the quality of an asset that keeps it from being
consumed by more than one entity. Knowledge assets, as
intangible assets, are generally considered non-rival since their
consumption by one entity does not keep other entities from
also consuming the asset. More specifically, personal data is
non-rival since the data generator can sell the same data to
more than one customer, the sale does not consume the data
itself, although it may have some effect on its value in terms
of exclusivity use, which raises the question of the exclusivity
of personal data.
When we talk about excludability we refer to the quality
of an asset that does not allow anyone but those who pay
for the asset to benefit from it. Generally, knowledge assets
are non-excludable because multiple people can benefit from
the transaction without being directly involved in it. The data
marketplace faces this same dilemma given that its currency
is a form of knowledge, knowledge asset, and a form of
intellectual capital. In order to answer this dilemma, and
in accordance with Lambin’s directives, a data marketplace
model must find a way to emulate excludability and rivalry to
be successful. Without these two qualities, it is impossible to
properly determine the value of personal data. A marketplace
cannot function if the value of what is for sale is unclear.
As stated by the knowledge dilemma, personal data in its
raw form cannot readily satisfy the requirements of rivalry
and excludability. A personal data marketplace will likely face
market failure if it cannot provide a solution to this dilemma,
therefore in order to describe how transactions take place,
the first order of business for a data marketplace model is
to propose a market structure which allows personal data to
be rivalrous and excludable.
Providing a structure that allows personal data to be ri-
valrous is the actual crux of the dilemma’s challenge to the
data marketplace since excludability is met by the virtue of
the marketplace transaction itself. Based on a buyer-seller
marketplace model, as suggested here, personal data transacted
on the data marketplace will only benefit those who pay for
it. It is entirely possible that additional parties may benefit
from the initial transaction, but that does not remove the
marketplace’s ability to meet the excludability requirement.
These benefits are not proportional to those the data buyer
stands to gain from the transaction, they are residual benefits.
For example, a possible scenario is one in which personal
data purchased on the marketplace is processed by a corporate
party and utilized to formulate predictions about customer
preferences with the aim of planning a marketing strategy
for a new product. A third party, an unassuming consumer
completely separate from the personal data transaction, may
benefit by having marketing tailored to their tastes. This benefit
5may manifest by bringing new and interesting products into
their sphere of awareness. This type of benefit is a byproduct of
the personal data transaction, it does not equate to non-paying
parties benefiting from the original transaction. Excludability
becomes a problem once again when we consider the post-
transition life of personal data. Because the transaction itself
does not consume the data, duplication and dissemination is
entirely possible post-transaction. This becomes problematic
for ensuring excludability is consistent in the marketplace
model, and also goes hand in hand with the rivalry problem.
Therefore, a deep dive into the nature of the rivalry problem,
and how to solve it, is required to move forward with our
analysis.
D. Solutions to the Knowledge Dilemma
What haunts data-based transactions is the fact that it can
be replicated at no cost before and after it is sold. The fact
that data is not consumed in the process of it being transacted
poses a fundamental problem to the marketplace. In order for a
data marketplace to meet the rivalry requirement it must then
address this challenge. At a high level consideration of this
challenge, personal data can be made to emulate a rivalrous
good in one of two ways: by artificially forcing its consump-
tion as a step in the transaction process, or by framing it with a
structure that places restrictions on its use that simulate rivalry.
The first solution can be referred to as the physical solution,
since its approach is to physically manipulate the good in
question, personal data, in order to change its problematic
qualities. The second solution can be referred to as a framing
solution, since its approach does not necessarily modify the
good in question, but instead it stipulates how the good can
be accessed and exploited. We consider the second solution
to be the best method for ensuring the data marketplace
meets the rivalry and excludability requirements and therefore
recommend its incorporation into the marketplace model as a
solution to the knowledge dilemma.
Indeed, physical solutions, in terms of technological im-
plementations such as Digital Rights Management (DRM),
rely on the viability of specific kinds of technology. If such
technologies fail, which inevitably happens in a fast-paced
technological context, an additional safety net is necessary to
ensure the physical solution through a framing solution, like
a legal framework. As a matter of fact, the physical solution
may only be used as a complement to the framing solution. On
the other hand, legal solutions are a strong ground to anchor
our marketplace mode, since we do not expect legal systems
to become irrelevant any time soon.
The framing solution can be implemented by packaging
personal data in a licensing framework that includes end-user
license agreements to define the rights of each party after
the data transaction is complete. Although it may not seem
evident, this solution is a natural extension of the user-centered
approach that steers the direction of the model proposed here.
Licenses serve as both a solution to the knowledge dilemma,
as well as safeguards that protect the data generator from
unintended uses of their data post-transaction. In order for
the framing solution to be effective, its licensing framework
must be anchored in clear legal reasoning. The power of this
solution withers if the licenses it proposes are not substantiated
in any way. We must look at the legal literature to provide the
framing solution with a steady anchoring.
There are two schools of thought on the relationship be-
tween privacy and copyright: Phillip Hacker’s analysis of the
legal traditions that inform Intellectual Property (IP) rights in
contrast to privacy rights highlights the differences between
the European tradition and the American one [7]. According to
Hacker, in Germany for instance, the legal tradition underwent
a “co-evolution [7]” stage during which copyright and privacy
laws stemmed from the same philosophical foundations, while
this type of coevolution is absent in the development of the
US development of IP law. This separation from traditions
consummated in a European tradition where IP and data
protection became anchored in personal rights, while the
American tradition considers IP and data protection to be
largely informed by their economic utility [7]. Nevertheless,
Hacker points out that beyond this theoretical difference there
is a rising consensus across both traditions, and the contexts
that surrounds them, that understands copyright as grounded
in the person, and the inalienable moral rights that protect
creative works as they relate to the personality and identity of
the person herself [7].
Hacker concedes that the tension between the personality-
grounding and the utility-grounding camps of IP discourse
does not dissipate entirely based on this newfound understand-
ing [7]. His argument is that the rising dissatisfaction with
the handling of personal data, on either side of the Atlantic,
reveals some truth about the weight of economic utility versus
privacy in personal data as perceived by users: that they are
at least equal in magnitude. This is not a claim to take lightly,
especially considering that those who hold this perception,
users who generate personal data, are in fact those very same
individuals who are the recipients of the rights that are up for
discussion in the first place [7]. To sum it up, in Hacker’s
own words, IP and privacy share a common ground and are
“both economically instrumental and an end in itself [7]”.
The inevitable conclusion that ensues from this view is that
marketplaces where IP rights are the subject of transactions
can be compared to, and inform the structure of, marketplaces
where privacy rights are the subject of transactions [7].
The model to look at for comparison then is that of an
IP regime that is personality-based. This model looks at IP
law with the perspective that “creators” retain a set of moral
rights which inextricably link them to their work. Hacker
gives the example of the moral rights of authors as they are
informed by a continental European approach to copyright
law, which includes rights such as the right to publication and
attribution [7]. This link between an author and the products
generated by her creative actions establishes a foundation for
a type of property right that informs how “ownership” of said
products is understood [7]. Based on this understanding of
IP, we can look at this model for parallel development of
a legal regime that provides an understanding of the types
of rights that generators of personal data are recipients to.
More specifically, we are looking for rights that allow us to
establish grounds for a framing solution based on contractual
6agreements which define licensed access to personal data in
exchange for compensation. Thus we draw a parallel between
the artists and their creative work, and the data generators and
their personal data. Although not evident, there are parallels to
draw on for such a comparison. An author’s creative work has
a fragment of her personhood inculcated in it, which makes
said work unique and identifiable. A dancer’s performance,
although choreographed, will be different every time, and
will be experienced differently every time by a witnessing
audience.
This phenomenon manifests in different forms. A familiar
one that demonstrates this effect of inculcated personhood in
creative performance is the guitar solo in musical performance:
a centerfold to many musical styles and traditions which relies
in part on an improvisational performance, unique to every
musician. One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the
use of the guitar solo in musician Django Reinhardt’s unique
Jazz legacy. Reinhardt is considered by some to be the “first
true jazz guitar hero [8]” based on his incredible skills as
an improvisational guitarist. Some have argued that Django’s
ability as a guitarist was in part a result of an accident that
subjected his left hand to burn injuries that both limited and
amplified his skill as an improvisational guitarist [8]. This
anecdote from Reinheardt’s life reflects a reality shared by
all artists: the uniqueness of the artist’s work is inextricably
linked to their personal qualities, physical form, and creative
faculties. It is tied to the artist’s identity, making the work
identifiable. This characteristic of uniqueness is in part what
can make personal data so valuable. Personal data is similar in
the way that it is the result of the combination of things that
makes us who we are: be it data generated by our interests,
our lifestyles, our occupations, or any other component of
our identities. If personal data was not the product of such
elements, it would not be identifiable in the first place.
An inevitable question then arises: how can we compare
the mundane activities that often are the spawning point of
IoT generated personal data to complex creative and artistic
endeavours like improvisational musical performance? The
question of “what is art” has been a subject of debate for a long
time. Preconceived notions of what can be called art, and on
what merit we can do so, have been refuted by artists such as
Marcel Duchamp, who pioneered the concept of “readymade”
art. Duchamp’s view was that the mundane can be elevated
to the status of art on the basis that artists themselves give
it that title, recognizing it as the result of their creative work
[9]. This dynamic is reflected in the creation of personal data:
it need not be beautiful, unique, or complex to be considered
personal. We see a parallel between creative works of art and
personal data based on the binding act that generates said data,
much like the way an artist claims their work to be art.
Moving back from the abstract to the concrete, given the
parallels we’ve highlighted between artists and data generators,
what legal concepts can we also analyse in parallel to inform
a personal data licensing framework? Hacker suggests that a
solution that frames property contractually is the best approach
for normatively anchoring personal data in a way that allows
it to be subject to the same kind of market transactions that
exist for IP [7]. The reasoning behind the selection of a
contractual solution is the flexibility that contracts afford: they
can be shaped to satisfy different requirements in different
contexts and can be modified in accordance with the interests
of the transacting parties [7]. As Hacker himself puts it: “a
contractual regime implicitly creates a variety of different
ways of using personal data, or of excluding third parties
from its use [7]”. This understanding completes our picture
of data ownership: the conceptual component provided by the
proximity based taxonomy that establishes property entitle-
ments based on the data’s instantiation, while the normative
component is established via contractual agreements between
data buyer and data seller that outline the rights recognised
and conditions to which the transaction is subject to, namely
permissions to use the data and compensation for said use.
E. The Personal Data License
The logical extension of this contractual solution in a
personal data marketplace is to formalize such contracts as
part of the transaction process. Our proposed vehicle for doing
so is the personal data license: an end-user agreement that
outlines the characteristics necessary to simulate rivalry and
excludability. The contract formalizes the willing exchange
of access and use of personal data for compensation. The
contractual solution then can establish use clauses that limit
the access of the data subject to the contract to a single
buyer: for instance, the data subject may agree to not sell
additional copies of their data. At the same time the contract
can establish clauses that limit the use of personal data by the
buyer: it may restrict the buyer to specific approved uses of
the data, and forbid others. The contract can also establish a
lifespan and scope for the access and use of personal data: a
defined period of time after which the buyer loses the right
to utilize and access the data and the data subject may place
said data back on the market. Essentially, the personal data
license allows for a normative framework through which the
use and access of data can be regulated in such a way so
as to replicate the effects of rivalry and excludability without
having to physically modify the data itself through technical
solutions. This normative framework safeguards both the buyer
and the seller against violations of the contractual agreement.
In light of this solution, a complete description of the licensing
framework, and its primary uses, follows.
In addition to providing a solution for the rivalry dilemma,
the licensing framework can also define and formalize some of
the more abstract characteristics of personal data. For example,
personal data in its raw form has a number of qualities that
can become problematic in a marketplace context. Personal
data has dynamic qualities that make the data valuable only
in relation to data from different points in time. For example
data about a subject’s weight loss over a period of time has a
certain value if taken into account within a given context: it’s
not exactly valuable to know that at a specific data point on a
given day the data subject has a specific body weight. On the
other hand, it could be very valuable to know that after that
given data point, the subject’s body weight decreased. This is
especially valuable if the information is accompanied by data
about exercise and diet at the given data points. A licensing
7framework can capture the value of this dynamic characteristic
of personal data and formalize it by establishing an agreement
ruling over a spectrum of data points, over time, in the license
itself.
At the same time, personal data has static qualities: these
are aspects of data that make individual data points valuable in
and of themselves based on the possibly unique configuration
of data at a given point in time. An example is a data point
including a marathon runner’s specific blood sugar level the
moment a race is completed, alongside their individual bio
information such as age, weight, height, etc. This is all static
information, its value is crystalized at a specific point in time.
Having a large sample of data about blood sugar levels upon
completing a long distance race, over a varied population,
could be valuable in developing recovery products for long
distance runners for example. Some static characteristics can
be problematic given that they do not come about via the data
subject’s activities, and are simply static data generated by
environmental and situational forces. Establishing ownership
of such static data might be problematic, as static qualities
may also give the data shared qualities: meaning that there is
information in those static data points that includes informa-
tion about others besides the primary data subject. The primary
example of this is information about the data subject’s genetic
profile. A data subject’s genetic profile necessarily includes
some information about the genetic profiles of her parents and
siblings. The license framework can establish boundaries on
how personal data with shared qualities should and should
not be accessed or processed by establishing what kind of
activities would constitute non-compliance with the license.
In effect, the data license would formalize agreements based
on two main activities performed by the party purchasing the
license: access and use. Access details would include infor-
mation about the regulation of access to the data, essentially
the lifespan of the license as well as the level of exclusivity.
The primary detail here, especially in consideration of this
licensing framework as a response to the rivalry dilemma,
is the formalization of exclusive access. This is the great
strength of the licensing framework: it can simulate rivalry
by granting the license owner exclusive access to the data and
precluding the license seller from selling additional licenses
to others, while at the same time establishing the resale of
the data by the license owner as an act of non-compliance.
The advantage of flexibility allows the licensing framework
to also grant the license seller the ability to sell additional
licenses if their agreement with the license buyer does not
require exclusivity to the data. In addition to details about
exclusive access, the data license would include details about
the lifespan of the access. After the established time period,
the license agreements ruling over access would expire and the
license would stipulate what kind of access rights are resumed:
the license seller may resume selling licenses and the owner
of the expired license may no longer use the data for example.
The licensing framework’s flexibility also allows what in
practice equates to ownership transfer of the data. A license
that stipulates exclusive access to the holder, while also
establishing a lifespan without expiry would simulate direct
sale, given that the use of the data as stipulated by the license
is appropriate, as well as allow a mechanism to facilitate the
right to be forgotten, as stipulated by the European General
Data Protection Regulation (EUGDPR) in terms of ceasing
data processing once consent is removed [3]. The same way
the licensing framework can formalize access rights, it can also
formalize use rights. This category of license details essentially
describes the scope of the license: what can be done with the
data and what can’t be done. The scope would prohibit the use
of personal data for illegal activities as well as the uses of the
data that could put the data subject in danger. The scope of the
license would also establish the kind of information that can be
extracted from the data. Returning to the discussion on shared
qualities, the license scope would establish that information
that can be extracted about individuals that are not the license
seller themselves is prohibited and non-compliant.
F. Risk as an Indicator of Value
Up until now, we have given primary consideration to
the elements that make personal data valuable for the data
consumer: the fact that personal data is a type of knowledge
asset that can fuel new economic models. Yet, a conceptual
model for a data marketplace would be incomplete were it not
to include a significant discussion on what makes personal
data valuable to data generators. If this was not the case,
data generators would not bother with a marketplace and
would be less reluctant to give away their personal data at
no cost. There is some discussion about whether it is the
case or not that individuals find personal data valuable at
all. Psychological models that explain individual perceptions,
attitudes, and opinions on the value of personal data are
beyond the scope of this paper. The marketplace model we
propose operates with the assumption that individuals willing
to enter into a transaction with a data buyer recognize that
their personal data holds value in an objective way. Where
does this value come from? Primarily, we propose that the
data generator understands the value of their data in terms
of the privacy component that is inherently found in personal
data, and the risk associated with the potential violation of
their privacy. In other words, personal data can be considered
valuable to data generators because it includes information
that can map and expose aspects of the data generator’s
privacy. Sharing that data is akin to exposure to certain risks
by compromising privacy. The relationship between risk and
privacy is both extremely complex, and a crucial component
of the way personal data is seen as valuable. Therefore, some
discussion on this topic is required in order to fully accomplish
a complete picture of the value of personal data.
Privacy is one of the more abstract concepts found in
modern society. It is not exactly easy to explain what privacy
is, and yet we all understand to some degree of clarity why
privacy is important. Furthermore, we all have a strong in-
clination towards indignation when we recognize that privacy
is violated. Often enough it is easier to highlight the impor-
tance of privacy through metaphor. For example, consider a
locksmith’s shop where keys are made. Within the shop, the
locksmith keeps a wall where he hangs up keys that have been
completed and are waiting to be picked up by a client. Is it
8a violation of the client’s privacy to have the keys exposed
to the public in this way? Anyone could walk in, and look
at any given key. More than that, they could photograph its
shape, or even flat out steal it. Most would agree this is not a
problem. Even if a malicious actor were to take a client’s key,
or replicate it in some way, the keys are not hung up according
to any order or pattern. The stolen key, to that malicious actor,
holds zero value beyond the value of the metal that composes
it. Alternatively, consider that the locksmith hangs the keys up,
and labels them according to the client’s first name to facilitate
delivery. Now imagine they are labeled by first and last name.
Perhaps they are also labeled by address. Now imagine they
are labeled according to full name, address, and household
income.
It quickly becomes evident that it is not the keys themselves
that are the problem, but the access they symbolize. Who
wouldn’t hesitate to utilize the services of the locksmith
with the latter organizing strategy for their completed keys?
There is an intangible element which connects the keys to the
clients, which we refer to as privacy. Once this connection
is intercepted, the clients are at risk of various harms. When
it comes to assessing the commercial value of this connec-
tion, we traditionally think of risk coverage in the form of
insurance. An individual may pay to become protected against
the potential damage represented by a risk. We’re looking at
this relationship in the inverse direction: an individual should
be compensated for exposing themselves to potential damage
represented by a risk.
Stepping away from metaphor, Daniel J. Solove provides
an excellent description of the benefits of privacy when he
claims that “privacy cannot be understood independently from
society [...] privacy is the relief from a range of kinds of
social friction [...] it is a protection from a cluster of related
activities that impinge upon people in related ways [10]”. This
protection is critical to understanding how personal data holds
intrinsic value, separate from the value that is determined by
the demand for such data from data buyers. When a data
generator decides to put their personal data on the market, they
forgo this protection and take on risks to a range of harms.
These harms are varied, but can be categorized to classify the
different risks that data generators take when they enter the
data marketplace. Solove has developed a taxonomy that sheds
light on a number of “privacy harms [10]” that are glaring
enough to be distinguishable.
Originally, Solove proposed his taxonomy to provide legal
systems with a bolstered understanding of privacy [10]. Yet,
the broader goal of Solove’s taxonomy is to exemplify the
distinct problems that individuals face when their privacy is
at risk [10], which is in line with the goal of clarifying the
relationship between risk and value for data generators. We
can therefore utilize Solove’s taxonomy to categorize privacy
risks associated with personal data, and qualify how the risk
magnitude can increase based on data types. Solove’s target
audience does have an impact on the granularity of his tax-
onomy: courts and legal scholars require in-depth articulation
of how to differentiate across many types of privacy harms.
We don’t need to use the full depth of Solove’s taxonomy to
categorize risks for our analysis. The logic behind Solove’s
taxonomy can be used as a reliable backbone to support an
attempt at categorizing the risks data generator’s are exposed
to in the data marketplace. Moreover, the intention behind
this assessment is to further highlight the relationship between
risk and value: the higher the risk magnitude associated with
given personal data, the higher the value it holds for the data
generator.
Solove’s taxonomy revolves around the “data subject [10]”,
meaning that the way different privacy harms are grouped
is determined by how they affect the data subject [10].
Solove’s activity groupings correspond to information collec-
tion, information processing, information dissemination, and
invasion [10]. In the taxonomy, each of these groups is further
broken down into “forms” in which the activity can manifest.
For example, information collection can take the form of
surveillance activities and interrogation activities [10]. Leaning
on metaphor once more, Solove makes the argument that
the activities that the taxonomy groups break down into are
separate and distinct, but still very much related, similar to how
members of a family share resemblances and traits, yet remain
distinct [10]. What is most salient to our cognitive model
from Solove’s taxonomy is the undercurrent, or the familiar
DNA, that runs under these different activities and connects
them. This unifying stream refers to two categorical effects
that different activities have on the data subject: dignitary
harm and structural harm [10]. Dignitary harm refers to those
privacy violations that result in damage to the data subject’s
reputation, or result in damage to the data subject’s social
environment by adding stress [10]. Separately from dignitary
harms, Solove identifies structural harms as those which do
not directly deal with the data subject’s social dimension,
but instead deal directly with effects on risk of future harm.
Structural harm either enhances the likelihood that the data
subject will be harmed in the future, or it shifts the balance
of power between the data subject and other entities in an
unfavourable way [10].
We can further exemplify how the two differ by analyzing
a privacy violating activity and fleshing out the different
strands of harm in it. Under Solove’s category of information
processing, secondary use of data is flagged as a privacy harm
and is defined as: “the use of data for purposes unrelated
to the purposes for which the data was initially collected
without the data subject’s consent [10]”. Secondary use poses
the structural harm of uncertainty and anxiety, the misuse of
this information places the data subject in a position where
they have no knowledge about how information about them
is being used, and how such secondary uses will impact their
lives, leaving them powerless [10]. In terms of dignitary harms,
secondary use of data can result in unwanted identification
and distortion of the data subject’s identity or reputation [10].
Secondary use of data can then: reveal information about the
data subject that was never meant to be exposed, it can distort
the data subject’s perception of reality, as well as distort the
data subject’s identity, and finally it can allow direct intrusions
into the data subject’s life that were never intended [10].
Throughout Solove’s taxonomy we see a similar pattern, these
privacy harms manifest in the same way: they expose the data
subject to the risk of revelation, distortion, and intrusion. From
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this finding, we propose a methodology for categorizing the
value of data, for the data subject, based on the magnitude
of risk that it poses, based on the ideas behind Solove’s
taxonomy.
The methodology essentially serves as a mechanism to pro-
vide a specific set of data with a tag that associates that data set
with a level of risk based on where it aligns according to a risk
matrix. This risk matrix is derived from the previous discussion
on harm types and their correlated risk impact (Figure 1). The
matrix is formed by intersecting cause and consequence: harm
type as a cause on the matrix’s vertical axis, and impact of risk
as a consequence on the matrix’s horizontal axis. Harm type
is layered. Distorting impact, revealing impact, and intruding
impact are each an aspect of impact that a given privacy
exposure can have on the data subject. Harm type ranges
on the matrix from a sequence of harm escalations beginning
with distortion (T=1), followed by revelation (T=2), and finally
intrusion (T=3) as the most severe harm type. Type acts as a
multiplier based on severity, intruding effects are three times
as severe as distorting, revealing are two times as severe, and
distorting are not multiplied. Impact of risk ranges according
to a spectrum: from low impact (C=1) to critical (C=5) impact.
The matrix serves as a tool to categorize personal data sets by
the risks that they exposes the data-subject to, ranging on a
scale from. The end result of applying the matrix to a data
set is a “risk tag” that associates a data set with a risk score
(R) calculated by adding the individual risk levels at each
type layer and dividing it by the maximum score of 30, the
maximum being where each type has a critical consequence.
For example, Data Set A (Figure 2) may expose the data-
subject to a major risk consequence of distortion , a critical
risk impact of revelation, and a minor risk impact of intrusion.
This data set would then be assigned a risk score of 20 out of
a potential 30, or approximately 67% risk. A data set’s risk
score can then be used to assign a risk value to the data set,
which ultimately contributes to the valuation of the data set
itself based on the magnitude of the risk it symbolizes for the
data subject.
G. Risk Modifiers
Having a strong understanding of risk magnitude using
the risk assessment methodology outlined in the previous
Example of Data Set A
Type (T) Consequence (C) Risk Level (C x T)
Distorting
(T=1)
Major
(C=4) 4
Revealing
(T=2)
Critical
(C=5) 10
Intruding
(T=3)
Minor
(C=2) 6
Risk Score 20/30 (67%)
Fig. 2. Risk Score Example
section, we turn to consider mechanisms that a personal data
marketplace can introduce in order to mitigate high risk. These
mechanisms take the shape of risk modifiers that lessen the
effects of high magnitude risks in data transactions. The core
strategy inside the risk modifier mechanism is to implement
risk mitigation techniques to modify the risk associated with
some data, therefore also affecting its value. This mechanism
comes into play when we consider specific instances of high
risk and high potential harm. Essentially, it is most relevant
in situations when considering the threat of malicious mar-
ketplace actors that seek to use the inherent risks built in to
personal data transactions to harm or exploit data subjects in
any way.
One of the primary concerns regarding privacy within the
context of selling IoT generated personal data involves the
idea of intended and unintended use of data, specifically with
the involvement of an adversary: a theoretical entity with a
malignant intent seeking to utilize purchased personal data to
draw dangerous correlations about the user that generated said
data. Because we are considering the sale of personal data in
a marketplace, the angle that we will take on privacy here
is not concerned with the danger of a possible data breach
and its repercussions. The threat of a data breach and the
danger it poses on privacy is common across all systems that
manage such data, therefore it is crucial that we drill down
to the privacy threats that are specific to a model in which
users put their own data up for sale willingly. As we have
already mentioned, this is a model that assumes that personal
data will be purchased and put to use. The model should
therefore safeguard users from a potential adversary who seeks
to purchase data with the intention of compromising the user’s
privacy for gain. We have already discussed intent when we
explored data licenses, and the different permissions for data
use should be explicitly stated in the data license agreement.
Nevertheless, an additional mechanism must exist to safeguard
against malicious actors if we seek to protect the privacy of
data generators in the marketplace. The personal data license
is not meant to be a deterrent against malicious activity, its
purpose is to formalize transaction agreements and protect
personal data rights. Indeed, the data license can operate as a
risk modifier via the effects of the use and access clauses of
the license. For example, a license that allows data to be re-
sold introduces additional risk to the transaction and thereby
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has an effect on pricing.
The threat of a malicious actor in the marketplace seeking
to purchase data with the goal of exploiting the privacy
of sellers on the marketplace is a distinct scenario, which
requires its own discussion. We suggest a two-pronged strategy
for this purpose: one approach is active and the other is
passive. The passive approach is a reputation system for the
data marketplace. This kind of mechanism actually serves a
dual purpose: it protects buyers and sellers from malicious
actors equally. It is not a mechanism specific to the scenario
with malicious data buyers seeking to exploit the privacy of
data generators. We will discuss this reputation mechanism at
length in the description of the marketplace model in the next
section of the paper. On the other hand, the active approach
we suggest here is directly relevant to the malicious buyer
scenario.
We have discussed at length how personal data is a chal-
lenging and complex knowledge asset, lying at the intersection
of many domains. Personal data, categorically, exists in an
overlap between private information, thus exclusive to a certain
extent, and commercially useful information, therefore desir-
able. This categorical overlap gives personal data the potential
to transform industry and fuel innovation for those that can
utilize it, but it also gives it the potential to devastate the
privacy of those that generate it. We must differentiate the two,
and somehow protect privacy without hindering utility. This is
difficult because they both operate in an overlap, therefore
modifying one has an effect on the other. For example, a user
sells a batch of data generated by walking across a variety
of terrains to a company that design shoes. The company
purchases the data with the aim of using it to optimize their
sneaker design. Our marketplace model must protect certain
aspects of the user’s data. In this case, the data should reveal
the details necessary for the optimization of the company’s
sneaker design: it should allow the company to determine the
effect of an incline on the stamina of the user generating
data walking a given distance, but it should not allow the
company to determine the address or work location of the
user generating the data via GPS coordinates.
Risk modifiers deal with both categories, they modify the
data to protect privacy, and therefore lessens risk. At the same
time, they also diminish the value of the data by decreasing
its utility. We need to consider the practical implications of
such mechanisms in the marketplace as they are implemented
to ensure they do not undermine the overall efficiency of the
marketplace. Currently, the convention agreed upon to address
this issue is the introduction of noise into the data in a careful
manner, so as to retain the useful components of it for the
buyer, but without revealing information about the seller that
an adversary could utilize [11]. This convention hinges on one
thing: it must be determined how much noise can the buyer
tolerate before the data is rendered useless for them.
This “utility-privacy tradeoff [11]” can become a consider-
able obstacle to the use of data in a context where we are
aiming to keep user privacy intact while maximizing data
utility. How do we find a balance within the tradeoff? A
possible answer is offered up by the data marketplace itself:
if we treat the degree of noise within data in the market as a
variable that can be adjusted, it can be considered a risk marker
that is taken into account when determining the monetary
value of the data. The users are given the ability to set the
“noise levels” within their data, based on recommendations
informed by the risk score generated from the data, therefore
protecting their privacy before selling. Buyers are given the
ability set their noise tolerance as they search for transaction
partners, therefore protecting their ability to utilize data by
signaling how much noise they are willing to tolerate before
buying. Introducing noise into the data devalues it, effectively
lowering its listing price on the marketplace. Noise free data
then becomes very expensive, and highly rewarding for sellers
at the expense of full privacy exposure. On the other hand, data
that has noise introduced into it to protect the seller’s privacy
is more affordable, therefore more attractive to buyers, and
safer for sellers.
The point where noise tolerance meets a satisfactory price
is the balance between utility and privacy as it is set by the
marketplace itself. This way, a theoretical adversary would
find their ability to draw correlations to be blocked by the
noise introduced into the data, and would be forced to pay
an unacceptable price to obtain the data without distortion,
these “noise-free” premiums would eat into whatever the-
oretical profit margin would result from their attempts to
manipulate the data marketplace and profit from compromising
users’ privacy. Essentially, noise as a risk modifier provides
a mechanism that allows the marketplace itself to find an
equilibrium point for different kinds of data in terms of what
is an acceptable transaction price for a given pairing of noise
and utility. We can take this kind of equilibrium point as
an inspiration to introduce how reputation, as a passive risk
modifier, can work in the marketplace. Having a reputation
score for buyers and sellers can also be an indicator of risk,
transacting with a low reputation partner is riskier, therefore
it can also serve as a market force to establish an equilibrium
point for pricing. Reputation can operate as a risk modifier
because it can protect privacy, lessening risk, and have an
effect on pricing. Take an exchange between a buyer with
a low reputation buying data with a high level of noise
modification. The high level of noise will likely reduce the
value of the data, therefore lowering its price, but the low
reputation of the buyer will impose a risk premium on their
end as well, thereby bringing the actual price to an equilibrium
point where the seller is properly compensated while their
privacy is protected.
H. Personal Data Value: the Full Picture
Our original analysis goal, and a requisite step to later
describe the dynamics of our marketplace model, was to define
what personal data looks like in a marketplace context. We
identified two components for this definition: ownership and
value. We defined ownership in a marketplace context based on
a taxonomy of proprietary proximity. Defining value proved
a more difficult task given it required an assessment of the
problematic qualities of personal data: namely its lack of
rivalry and excludability, and its inherent risk components.
In order to clarify the value of personal data, we decided to
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embed personal data within a licensing framework, and to tag
it through a risk assessment that identifies its risk components.
By doing so, we have established two aspects of the definition
of personal data in a marketplace context that can inform its
value: the license characteristics of a given set of personal data,
and its given risk assessment. With these two in mind, we can
return to the introductory discussion from the beginning of
this paper to complete our picture of personal data value in a
marketplace context.
Demand
Risk Licensing
Fig. 3. Value Model
We can begin to see the full picture of our value model take
shape (Figure 3). The effect of licensing and risk on value
are components that inform our understanding of data value
from the perspective of the data generator, but we must also
consider how market demand informs the value of personal
data. Modelling market demand is beyond the scope of this
paper, we operate with the assumption that there is demand
exists based on the implications of industrial advancement
using personal data. Even though it is an assumption of our
analysis, it would be a mistake to not consider its effect on the
value of personal data. Our definition of personal data value
is a model that helps clarify where the market-level price for
personal data should eventually come from. Making market-
level price predictions is beyond the scope of this paper given
the variety of personal data categories and circumstances that
can be thought up. Instead, our personal data value analysis
serves as our model for informing marketplace transaction
dynamics with the understanding that a final market-level
price for personal data should be determined by licensing,
risk, and demand. In this model, licensing corresponds to the
specifications of data access and use associated with a given
product listing, risk corresponds to the risk value alongside
risk modifiers applied in that product listing, and demand
corresponds to the actual market demand for a product with
the aforementioned specifications.
III. PROPOSED MARKETPLACE MODEL & INTERACTIONS
A. Goal of Data Marketplace
Now that we have defined the marketplace context as
well as its dynamics, we can move on to a full fledged
description of how our proposed marketplace model operates.
Previously we focused on the definition of personal data
in a marketplace context to give a clear understanding of
the requirements of marketplace transactions. This definition
yields the data product that is the subject of our marketplace
model and its interactions. This section describes the process
through which marketplace transactions are resolved, namely
the transaction flow, while addressing the challenges that have
become relevant as part of our initial analysis. Our proposed
marketplace model includes the model components we have
described already, as well as introduces additional components
that complete the model.
B. Marketplace Model Description
Our proposed marketplace model is a digital platform that
facilitates personal data transactions. In our previous analysis
we outlined a series of model components required to address
some of the anticipated obstacles the marketplace would face
due to the challenges posed by placing personal data in a mar-
ketplace context. Given that the marketplace model includes
such model components as risk assessment and modification,
and license generation, we recognize that the marketplace
model will include some type of agent to monitor tasks
required by the model’s implementation of said components.
This brings us to a defining point in our description of the
marketplace model: how heavy handed should this authority
be in its oversight of the marketplace model, and what kind
of effect does this have on the model itself?
The question comes down to a decision between a central-
ized or a decentralized marketplace structure. It is true that
centralization exists in a spectrum but a critical distinction
exists between decentralized and centralized structures regard-
less of their location on a spectrum. What we mean by a
centralization is a structure that requires activity to transpire
exclusively through a given medium, interactions between
different stakeholders are all monitored by a single actor or
organization. We see decentralization on the other hand as a
structure that allows direct interaction between stakeholders
with little or no mediation. The differences between these
two organizational characteristics has a number of effects on
the marketplace model on a practical level. These differences
are particularly evident in the diffusion of responsibilities and
expectations from marketplace stakeholders.
This decision between structures would result in two differ-
ent kinds of marketplace models. The first kind, a centralized
marketplace, would be a data marketplace where a marketplace
orchestrator has complete control over transactions: buyers
and sellers do not interact with each other. In a centralized
marketplace model, data generators submit their data to a
centralized repository in the marketplace, and data buyers
query the orchestrator with their specific demands for data
consumption. The orchestrator then responds with a suitable
candidate from its inventory of personal data, collects payment
from the buyer and compensates the seller. This is a rough
simplification of how the transaction may actually transpire
and includes no discussion on the software and hardware
architecture required and utilized for a transaction to be
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resolved. Although such specifications are important, they
do not change the essence of how a centralized marketplace
transaction would take place, which is what we describe.
On the other hand, a decentralized marketplace model would
be where data generators and data buyers do interact. In a
decentralized marketplace buyers can select from listings that
are made available by sellers. Once a buyer finds a listing they
are interested in, a monitored exchange takes place between
stakeholders with the help of the orchestrator. Again, no
software or hardware specifications are necessary just yet to
clarify how this transaction unfolds. We see a decentralized
marketplace model to be in line with our central mission:
making the marketplace user centric and giving data generators
the necessary latitude to protect their privacy and data rights.
There is a monitoring role to be played by the marketplace,
and we have already highlighted what responsibilities that role
may entail, but fundamentally the dynamic of the marketplace
is one between peers with little mediation by the orchestrator.
Specific architectures have been proposed elsewhere for
data marketplaces. Although we don’t propose a specific
technology for implementing our model, there is a benefit
in discussing examples of what kind of architecture could
be used to implement what we propose here. Roman and
Stefano provide a reference architecture for a trust-enabled
data marketplace that is decentralized [12]. Much like our-
selves, they recognize the disadvantage of current central-
ized systems. They argue that centralized marketplaces have
heavy and often obtuse access processes, including terms and
conditions and other agreements, which make participation
difficult and take control away data generators [12]. Their
reference architecture is designed to allow different parties to
interact in a distributed manner, with some assistance from
an orchestrating agent [12]. Their implementation is based
on the use of homomorphic encryption in tandem with Multi
Party Computing in an encrypted cloud environment to allow
multiple different data consumers to access and process data
aggregated and stored by data generators, using a Blockchain
to process payments and authorizations [12]. The architecture
suggested by the authors could easily be modified to be
used as a reference for the implementation of our proposed
model. We have decided to remain quasi-agnostic regarding a
specific technological implementation for our proposed model
to emphasize its flexibility as a conceptual model that can be
adopted under different contexts and towards different ends.
Ultimately, we do recognize the large advantage that using
distributed architectures and privacy enhancing technologies
bring to our model, and include them in our description.
C. Marketplace Actors
With a clear picture of the kind of marketplace model we
have in mind, we can describe the marketplace actors. Our
marketplace model involves three actors: data generators with
the role of sellers, data consumers with the role of buyers, and
an orchestrator with the role of monitor. Each actor has specific
motivations, goals, and concerns linked to their participation
in the data marketplace.
Motivation
Buyer
Goals Concerns
Acquire data 
Data Analysis
Enhance 
Performance
Data Validity
Data Utility
Fig. 4. Buyer Model
Data buyers (Figure 4)1 are actors who have the intention
of purchasing data. Their primary motivation is to acquire
data that can be subjected to data processing or algorithmic
analysis to generate insights that can inform their activities.
Based on the current commercial climate highlighted earlier
in this paper, the current understanding of such an actor is
a corporate entity that is interested in gaining commercial
advantages through these insights. Their goal may be to
use information distilled from personal data to craft new
products, tailor their services to a specified customer base,
or modify their marketing and outreach strategies, as well
as other kinds of activities. A generalized goal exists across
these activities that can be applied to the category of the
data buyers’ diverse goals: to harness the utility of personal
data to improve performance. In response to this motivation
and goal, data buyers’ concerns regarding their participation
in the marketplace is the requirement of a guarantee that
the data they acquire will have the utility they expect. This
guarantee must fulfill two criteria: a demand for validity and
a demand for exclusivity. This concern is a manifestation of
the adverse selection problem in the sense that it is the result
of an information asymmetry between buyer and seller. The
marketplace must address this asymmetry to keep data buyers
motivated to participate, therefore some form of data validation
mechanism is necessary, as well as a mechanism to determine
the degree of exclusivity that buyers and sellers are willing to
transact over. The role of the data buyer is to specify the kind
of data they want to acquire, as well as information about the
price they are willing to transact under and their exclusivity
requirements according to their utility expectations.
Data generators (Figure 5) are actors who are interested in
selling access to their personal data. Their primary motiva-
tion for participating in the marketplace is financial gain as
compensation for their data. The goal of data generators is to
successfully engage in marketplace transactions that result in
their financial compensation without sacrificing privacy rights
or control over their data, while mitigating the risks associated
with personal data transactions. We have already established
the risk and value components of personal data earlier in the
1Icons by https://icons8.com/, used under CC license
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Fig. 5. Seller Model
paper, which are the concepts that inform the data generator’s
goals. A market value for data is also relevant, as indicated
by the willingness to buy that exists via the data buyer’s
motivation, so the data generator’s goals lie on a balance
between three weights that determine the value of personal
data: risk, licensing, and demand. The goals of data generators
compete with the goals of data buyers on the privacy front:
their concern is that their privacy and control will diminish
in importance under marketplace dynamics. This concern is
a manifestation of the expropriation problem: it is a result of
the power asymmetry between buyer and seller based on the
low cost of data replication. Since there is no cost associated
with replicating the data, it is likely that data generators will
lose all control over their personal data, and its uses, once it is
sold. The marketplace must address this asymmetry as well in
order to keep sellers engaged. The role of the data generator is
to specify their willingness to transact, including information
about the price they are willing to transact over as well as the
specification of access and use.
Motivation
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Fig. 6. Orchestrator Model
The last actor to be described is the orchestrator (Figure 6).
This kind of actor is different from the data generator and
the data buyer. The orchestrator does not need to be an actual
person, it can be a set of mechanisms embedded in a system
architecture or a software. Even if it is a non-human entity, its
design must follow a set of motivations, goals and concerns.
The orchestrator has the single motivation of keeping the other
two stakeholders engaged in the marketplace. Essentially, the
orchestrator has the motivation of resolving the concerns of
the two other actors. The goal of the orchestrator is to avoid
market failure: a situation in which no seller or buyer can
engage in efficient and beneficial transactions due to different
obstacles. The orchestrator’s concerns are clearly defined by
what hazards we have highlighted that can pose significant
threats to a personal data marketplace.
Four kinds of hazard are evident: challenges rising from
asymmetries amongst actors, personal data challenges rising
from the nature of the subject of exchange in the market-
place, governance challenges rising from the legal context
which personal data transactions take place, and behavioural
challenges that are involved in any model where actors may
have competing interests. Therefore the orchestrator has the
role of resolving or at least mitigating the effects of the
adverse selection and expropriation dilemma, as well as the
rivalry and excludability problems. In addition to these two
marketplace and data challenges, the orchestrator must also
monitor behaviour and enforce the policies according to which
the model is governed. This role includes facilitating inter-
actions between buyers and sellers to mitigate information
asymmetries, maintain the licensing framework that keeps
personal data rival and exclusive, enforce policies that would
lead to abuse of the model or criminal activity, and finally
monitoring against marketplace manipulation.
As mentioned before, the orchestrator does not need to be a
person. As a matter of fact, the marketplace model we propose
here has a distributed orchestrator: essentially an aggregate
of monitoring activities across the transaction process that
ensure marketplace policy is followed. The cardinality of the
orchestrator is not necessarily limited, at any given point
in time different entities can act as an orchestrator as they
monitor necessary marketplace functions. Our vision is that
of an authority, as a single unit or an aggregate of units
or mechanisms, that can act as a digital notary witnessing
and validating different functions of the marketplace, and
signaling for necessary marketplace actions under specific cir-
cumstances. Our proposed implementation for this orchestrator
role relies on open standards due to their inherent benefits of
balance and openness, as well as interoperability and potential
for innovation [13].
D. Valuation & Pricing
The value of personal data is the central motivating force
behind the actors in the marketplace. The next logical step
after having a model that explains how personal data is valued
is to determine how value translates to price in order to
move forward to a transaction agreement in the transaction
process. A successful transaction requires that both parties
agree on a price to transact over, therefore we must elaborate
on how our value model can produce a price for a given
transaction. We identified three determinants of data value in
our definition: demand, licensing, and risk. Our value model
operates as a pricing function that takes actor behavior as
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an input, and returns a price as a result. This function is
conceptually equivalent to our three-part value model and is
only different in terms of speaking of a pricing function as the
actual implementation of our value model at a marketplace-
level. Describing how the value model works alongside our
descriptions of marketplace actors help determine a price
requires an overview of how these components function, as
well as some new insights into how they interact.
As per the model definition, the value is determined by
three elements: information about risks, information about
demand, and information about licensing. This information is
provided by the different goals, concerns, and motivations that
we have highlighted in the actor models. Correspondingly, our
pricing function allows us to fully explain how the value of
personal data in the marketplace is a result of marketplace
behaviors and decisions. These behaviours and decisions are
informed by the qualities and asymmetries of personal data
that we have taken the time to discuss at length in the
first part of this paper. Considering our complete view of
our value model, there is a final step that separates value
from price, namely details that are not unique to personal
data itself as determinants of value. As the pricing function
takes input from the behaviour of marketplace actors, and
outputs a pricing estimate, an additional consideration must
take place to translate this estimate into a market level price
recommendation. Transaction details such as quantity of data
allow a final price recommendation since the valuation of
personal data as done at a single-unit level.
The first input component of the pricing function is demand.
In our original description of the value model, we inferred
that demand was an assumption made based on contemporary
views on the potential of personal data and projections of
future uses. Now that we have defined the actors that engage in
the marketplace though, we can look at how their behaviours
actually would affect demand. The two relevant aspects of the
marketplace actors in relation to demand are the motivations
of buyers and sellers as described by their respective models.
Buyers are motivated to acquire data and in turn sellers
are motivated by financial compensation in return for access
to their data. The feedback between these two behaviours
establishes the demand aspect of the value model, and the way
in which they can differ has an effect on pricing via the variety
of inputs into the pricing function that these motivations can
take. For example, if not enough buyers are motivated to
acquire a specific kind of data, or not enough sellers are
motivated to seek financial compensation in exchange for a
specific kind of their personal data, this will have an impact
on the price of said kind of data, following traditional supply
and demand marketplace dynamics.
The second input component of the pricing function is
risk. We established a risk matrix earlier in the paper to
determine the risk score of specific kinds of personal data
on the marketplace. Now that we have defined the concerns
that make this risk matrix relevant for actors, we can see
how risk scores can have an effect on the price of data.
We know that data buyers have as one of their goals the
utilization of data for enhancing performance, which requires
valid personal data. At the same time, buyers have the concern
that invalid data will not lead them to false findings, and not
be an asset in terms of enhancing their performance. In turn,
data sellers are concerned that allowing access to the details
of their personal data exposes them to privacy harms. The
resulting dynamic between these two types of behavior is a
balance between privacy and utility, as it is determined by
risk modifiers. The risk matrix helps establish the extent of
privacy harms in a categorical manner, providing a framework
to assess how a tradeoff between utility and privacy can
be managed using modifiers themselves. Privacy harms can
be mitigated by modifying data, while affecting its utility.
Therefore, the impact of risk modifiers on the price of data
will be considerable, as we have already established.
The final input component of the value function is licensing.
Licensing represents a number of key factors in the model. It is
a mechanism through which we can address the lack of native
rivalry and excludability in personal data as a product. It allows
data buyers to access the data they require to meet their goals,
and at the same time it allows individuals to retain some say
over what happens with their personal data. It is a bridging
mechanism necessitated by the tradeoff between access and
control. The personal data license establishes an understanding
between buyer and seller that stipulates what kind of access
and use is allowed, and what kind is not. The details included
in this agreement have an impact on the value of the access to
the data, and therefore its price. Similar to any kind of license,
an agreement that allows a longer period of use will generally
cost more than an agreement that limits the amount of time
a data buyer has to utilize their access for maximum benefit.
Additionally, licensing can have other impacts on the value of
the data access based on further limitations. For example, a
license that allows the access to be shared with second parties
may be more costly given that it requires a data seller to
consent to a less restrictive agreement. The behaviours that
act as input into the licensing component of our value model
come from the remaining goals and concerns of data buyers
and sellers, namely the buyer’s need for access and use, and
the seller’s need for control. The variations in these two inputs
help inform the price that our pricing function provides for a
type of data, embedded in a licensing agreement.
E. Transaction process
Up until now we have focused on challenges of a personal
data marketplace, and have crafted a series of model com-
ponents required to address these challenges. Having fully
delved into the risk assessment, the data license, the pricing
function, and the actor models, we can put them together in
a practical explanation of how the marketplace operates using
these components. This section serves as an explanation of a
standard data transaction taking place in the marketplace. The
transaction process incorporates three actors: buyer, seller, and
orchestrator. It is important to recall that this is a decentralized
online platform, therefore there is little mediation in terms
of the interactions between buyers and sellers. Our model
demonstrates this, where the orchestrator assists buyer and
sellers as well as monitors marketplace behaviour as necessary.
An additional thing to keep in mind before we begin the
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Fig. 7. Transaction Model
description of the transaction process: this description only
incorporates one buyer and one seller, while in reality there
are multiple buyers and sellers taking the same actions across
the marketplace.
The transaction process is composed of seven functions:
identification, specification, market search, product generation,
market match, subsample analysis, and exchange. A full
description of each phase follows, but the essential progression
of a transaction flows via the resolution of these functions, and
the decisions they prompt. The transaction flow as described is
sequential, but not necessarily linear. Each of these functions
must take place sequentially at some point in time for a
transaction to be completed, but it does not mean that every
transaction needs to execute linearly through each function
every time.The path of buyers and sellers cross in terms of
motivations, concerns, and goals, but they require consensus
on decisions only twice for a transaction to result in a
successful exchange. If a decision results in unwillingness to
proceed to the next function in the transaction flow buyers and
sellers may reconfigure their specifications as the marketplace
dynamics change. Once a buyer reaches a decision point,
they may decide the price to be too high. They can return
to their specifications to reformulate their needs and search
accordingly to their budget, or they can return to a new market
search and keep looking for the same kind of listing to appear
at a lower price. If a seller finds their listing remains on the
market for too long, and no interest is shown, they can return
to their specifications and reconfigure them to better suit the
market.
The first function of the transaction process is identification
(1 in Figure 7). This is the point at which buyers and sellers
enter the marketplace either as new members, or if they
are returning members simply return for a new transaction.
The identification function itself is comprised of a number
of events. Initially, the buyer and seller have their identity
authenticated as members of the marketplace. This is likely
implemented through a login system, not unlike most popular
digital platforms. Specific information is associated with the
identity of marketplace members, the most important being
reputation. A reputation system must be in place to mitigate
the effects of the information asymmetries that we have so
far discussed. Part of the adverse selection problem revolves
around uncertainty. The reality is that malicious actors exist,
and they can be a threat to the health of the marketplace
because they introduce the possibility of risk and loss for
buyers and sellers. Buyers transacting with a malicious seller
risk losing their investment by being sold junk data, and sellers
transacting with a malicious buyer risk exploitation and having
their privacy compromised. Reputation is a mechanism that
limits the effects of malicious actors in the marketplace, and
mitigates the effects of the adverse selection problem.
As such, a reputation check within the identification func-
tion is monitored by the orchestrator. Reputation allows buyers
and sellers to build rapport inside the marketplace as they
complete transactions. The marketplace orchestrator monitors
how the reputation of members fluctuates, and uses this
information to advise members accordingly based on their
potential transaction partner. The reputation of buyers and
sellers can be harmed: if a seller exchanges data that is not
as described, or corrupted in any way, their reputation will
decrease flagging them as a risky transaction partner. At the
same time, buyers who engage in suspicious behaviour will
also have their reputation decreased. Monitoring reputation
allows that information to be later used as a passive form
of risk modifier.
A few options exist for implementing reputation, we simply
describe it as a necessary mechanisms to mitigate marketplace
risks. An example could be a dispute resolution system where
sellers can raise claims of license violations to have a buyer’s
reputation lowered, or have them outrightly removed from the
marketplace. Leaning too much on a description of the how
the reputation mechanism is implemented is a slippery slope
since it leads down to some of the more rampant and complex
problems of digital platforms at large, such as fraud. It is
essential though that reputation be included since it is a crucial
mechanism that reinforces the risk mitigation component of
our marketplace model. Our proposed implementation is to
represent reputation using a graph, where nodes represent
marketplace members, and edges represent completed transac-
tions. In this representation, transaction edges are associated
with a weight determined by the reputation of the transaction
partner. This way, reputation is not only evaluated based
on the number of completed transactions, but also by the
aggregated reputation of all transaction partners. This kind
of implementation is not heavy handed, is in line with our
decentralized approach, and can be performed by distributed
orchestrators.
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Specification (2 in Figure 7) follows the identification
function in the transaction flow. This function is common
across both buyers and sellers, but the actual details of how it
is performed differ between these actors. During specification,
buyers determine what kind of data they are searching for,
according to what access and use details. Additional specifi-
cations determined by the buyer can include the reputation of
sellers listing the product, as well as the level of noise included
in the data listed as a risk modifier. Sellers specifications
are utilized in the product generation function further down
the transaction flow. Sellers must specify the type of data
they want to sell, which includes categorical details about the
data such as qualities like range of time during which the
data was collected, and quantity of data points in the listing.
Additionally, the seller must specify their privacy preferences
to help apply risk modifiers, as well as select a license that
proposes terms of use and access that correspond to said
preferences.
Much like seller specifications inform the product genera-
tion function, buyer specifications inform the market search
function (3 in Figure 7). Market search is undertaken ex-
clusively by buyers. It is the point in the transaction flow
where buyers are actively looking for product listings on the
marketplace that match their specifications. Like most digital
platforms, this process can be supported by additional search
filters that help buyers find the exact kind of data they require.
The counterpart to market search is the product generation
function (4 in Figure 7). This point in the transaction flow
is heavily informed by the seller’s specifications, and it is
supported by the orchestrator in terms of monitoring and
logistics. There are four elements that make up the product
generation phase: risk assessment, risk modification, licensing,
and pricing. Risk assessment is performed according to the
methodology outlined in our discussion of risk scores. Using
the seller’s specifications regarding the data provided, an
assessment is made using our risk matrix to determine the
magnitude of the risk represented by the sale of such data.
In response to this risk assessment, risk modification can take
place in the form of noise injection. The data can be distorted
using noise as a privacy enhancing strategy. Once risk has been
assessed, and possibly modified, the seller’s specifications on
terms of use and access are used to select a personal data
license to formalize which personal rights are retained by the
seller, and which are granted to the buyer. Finally, the pricing
function is applied using input from the risk assessment and
modification, as well as the licensing restrictions, to generate
a pricing recommendation that takes into account marketplace
demand for the data already specified. The seller is entirely
allowed to reject this pricing recommendation.
The goal of providing such a recommendation is to inform
the seller, and give them the aforementioned latitude regarding
transaction control. We don’t assume that sellers have an
objective understanding of the value of personal data, hence
the pricing recommendation using the pricing function serves
as a guide for sellers. Seller’s may overprice, or underprice
their data as they wish, with positive or negative effects. They
may not, however, reject the pricing modifications incurred by
risk modification using noise. There is a discount applied to
the product based on the level of distortion in the data that
is essential to the risk modification mechanism. If sellers are
allowed to sell noise-free data at the same price as distorted
product counterparts, the entire risk modification mechanism is
undermined as far as enhancing privacy via noise is concerned.
Similarly, sellers may not reject the pricing modification
incurred by having a low reputation in the marketplace due
to the same reasoning.
The product generation function is closely monitored by the
orchestrator to ensure sellers do not undermine the effect of
risk modifiers, as well as to ensure that sellers formalize their
specifications via licensing. Once a price is set, the product
generation function ends and the product itself is listed on
the market . A market match takes place when a market
search encounters a product listing, or a number of listings,
that matches buyer specifications (5 in Figure 7). This brings
the transaction flow to the first decision point: is the price
acceptable to the buyer? If the price of the listing is acceptable,
the transaction flow moves to the next function, otherwise the
buyer may return to the listing match to consider other options,
or may reconfigure their specifications and launch an entirely
new market search.
If the price is acceptable, the transaction flow continues
to the subsample analysis function (6 in Figure 7). The
subsampling function serves to safeguard buyers from mali-
cious sellers. It is a form of validation necessitated by the
information asymmetry that is inherent to intangible products.
We don’t propose a specific subsampling technique as part of
our model, but we do include it as a necessary mechanism
to address the adverse selection and expropriation problems.
As previously discussed, the adverse selection problem refers
to an information asymmetry that’s problematic for the sale
of personal data: simply put, buyers cannot readily observe
if the product they are interested in buying is legitimate or
not from the product listing. Some kind of data validation is
required to mitigate this asymmetry, which is the intention of
introducing a subsampling mechanism. This leads us directly
to the expropriation problem. Subsampling can expose sellers
to privacy risks without compensation, as well as other kinds
of market hazards like subsampling replication and other forms
of fraud. For this reason, subsampling must be limited as
a mechanism, and closely monitored by the orchestrator to
ensure it is not used to manipulate the marketplace with
malicious intentions. Once a buyer reaches the subsampling
stage, they may accept or reject the subsample based on their
original specifications for a market search. If the buyer rejects
the subsample without any basis to do so, they risk different
marketplace repercussions. Buyers that consistently demand
subsamples, only to reject them will have their reputation
lowered, and their ability to request subsamples suspended.
If the buyer accepts the subsample, they are essentially
recognizing the validity of the data in the product listing, as per
their specifications, and the transaction flow can move to the
final function: exchange (7 Figure 7). The exchange function
can be implemented in different ways. In our model, it simply
represents the exchange of data for financial compensation
between buyer and seller. Depending on the amount of data,
as well as the price to be paid, the details of the exchange may
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need to be adjusted. This is why the exchange function must be
monitored by the orchestrator. Some exchanges may require an
orchestrator to act as escrow between the transaction partners
to ensure the exchange can be resolved adequately. In addition,
the orchestrator is required to closely monitor the exchange
because refusal of payment or refusal of data delivery at
this point in the transaction flow must be reflected in the
reputation of the transgressing transaction party, and penalties
must be dealt accordingly. On the other hand, monitoring is
also necessary so that the respective reputation of transaction
partners can be updated in response to a successful exchange,
thereby bringing the transaction flow to its end and completing
our description of the transaction process.
IV. CONCLUSION
We originally set out to answer the following question:
what is the best model to use when dealing with the sale of
personal data while keeping privacy intact? As a response, we
analysed personal data in the abstract to distill the challenging
qualities that had to be addressed by a model in which personal
data can be transacted. In doing so, we outlined some key
challenges. First, the challenges brought on by a personal
data marketplace, like the adverse selection and expropriation
problems. Second, the challenges brought on by personal
data in the marketplace, such as rivalry and excludability.
From these challenges we moved on to provide a definition
of personal data in the marketplace context, as well as to
describe its value. Our proposed marketplace model serves as
a response to these challenges, as well as a blueprint for the
implementation of a decentralized personal data marketplace
that gives data generators the ability to protect their privacy
and retain control of their data.
As mentioned in our introduction, our proposed marketplace
model is conceptual. It is not a directive on implementation.
We recommend the use of some technologies, and discourage
architectures that are not user centric or heavily centralized.
The field of IoT and personal data has a bright future, and a
long road ahead of it. Our proposed model can serve as a guide
for further developments and architectures that deal with IoT
and personal data, as well as a starting point for discussions
on privacy centric personal data marketplaces.
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